Epictetus · c. 50 – c. 135 CE
Discourses 2.26 ¶1 — Epictetus
From “What Is the Property of Error”
Translation by George Long (1877)
Epictetus, Discourses 2.26 ¶1
Every error comprehends contradiction: for since he who errs does not wish to err, but to be right, it is plain that he does not do what he wishes. For what does the thief wish to do? That which is for his own interest. If then the theft is not for his interest, he does not do that which he wishes. But every rational soul is by nature offended at contradiction, and so long as it does not understand this contradiction, it is not hindered from doing contradictory things: but when it does understand the contradiction, it must of necessity avoid the contradiction and avoid it as much as a man must dissent from the false when he sees that a thing is false; but so long as this falsehood does not appear to him, he assents to it as to truth.
Cite this passage
Epictetus, Discourses 2.26 ¶1, tr. George Long (1877)
https://whatwouldstoicsdo.com/passage/discourses/2.26.1
Epictetus, Discourses (as recorded by Arrian), tr. George Long (1877). Text: Standard Ebooks (CC0). Sources and licences
In plain English
AI-written notesAnyone who does wrong still wants something good for themselves, so a wrong act contradicts their own aim, for example a thief whose theft does not really serve his interest. People keep making such mistakes until they see the contradiction, and then their own reason makes them avoid it.
Older wording
- “rational soul”
- — the reasoning part of a person
- “assents”
- — agrees to as true
Themes and situations
- Judgements and impressions
- Virtue and character
- Justice and fairness
- Learning and progress
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