Discourses 4.1 ¶9 — Epictetus

Epictetus, Discourses 4.1 ¶9

Whether then have you nothing which is in your own power, which depends on yourself only and cannot be taken from you, or have you anything of the kind?—“I know not.”—Look at the thing then thus, and examine it. Is any man able to make you assent to that which is false—“No man.”—In the matter of assent then you are free from hindrance and obstruction.—“Granted.”—Well; and can a man force you to desire to move towards that to which you do not choose?—“He can, for when he threatens me with death or bonds, he compels me to desire to move towards it.” If then, you despise death and bonds, do you still pay any regard to him?—“No.”—Is then the despising of death an act of your own or is it not yours?—“It is my act.”—It is your own act then also to desire to move towards a thing: or is it not so?—“It is my own act.”—But to desire to move away from a thing, whose act is that? This also is your act.—“What then if I have attempted to walk, suppose another should hinder me.”—What part of you does he hinder? does he hinder the faculty of assent?—“No: but my poor body.”—Yes, as he would do with a stone.—“Granted; but I no longer walk.”—And who told you that walking is your own act free from hindrance? for I said that this only was free from hindrance: to desire to move; but where there is need of body and its cooperation, you have heard long ago that nothing is your own.—“Granted this also.”—And who can compel you to desire what you do not wish?—“No man.”—And to propose or intend, or in short to make use of the appearances which present themselves, can any man compel you?—“He cannot do this: but he will hinder me when I desire from obtaining what I desire.”—If you desire anything which is your own, and one of the things which cannot be hindered, how will he hinder you?—“He cannot in any way.”—Who then tells you that he who desires the things that belong to another is free from hindrance?