Epictetus · c. 50 – c. 135 CE
Discourses 4.6 ¶6 — Epictetus
From “Against Those Who Lament Over Being Pitied”
Translation by George Long (1877)
Epictetus, Discourses 4.6 ¶6
So great then being the difference in desires, actions, wishes, would you still have the same share with others in those things about which you have not labored, and they have labored? Then are you surprised if they pity you, and are you vexed? But they are not vexed if you pity them. Why? Because they are convinced that they have that which is good, and you are not convinced. For this reason you are not satisfied with your own, but you desire that which they have: but they are satisfied with their own, and do not desire what you have: since if you were really convinced that with respect to what is good, it is you who are the possessor of it and that they have missed it, you would not even have thought of what they say about you.
Cite this passage
Epictetus, Discourses 4.6 ¶6, tr. George Long (1877)
https://whatwouldstoicsdo.com/passage/discourses/4.6.6
Epictetus, Discourses (as recorded by Arrian), tr. George Long (1877). Text: Standard Ebooks (CC0). Sources and licences
In plain English
AI-written notesPeople can only make you feel pitied or inferior if you share their idea of what is good. They are not upset when you pity them because they are convinced they have what matters, and if you were equally sure of your own good, their opinion of you would barely cross your mind.
Themes and situations
- Reputation and others' opinions
- Envy and comparison
- Judgements and impressions
- Insult and criticism
- Being criticised or insulted
- Envy and comparison
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