Epictetus · c. 50 – c. 135 CE
Discourses 2.17 ¶2 — Epictetus
From “How We Must Adapt Preconceptions to Particular Cases”
Translation by George Long (1877)
Epictetus, Discourses 2.17 ¶2
So it is in this matter also, in the things which concern life. Who among us does not speak of good and bad, of useful and not useful; for who among us has not a preconception of each of these things? Is it then a distinct and perfect preconception? Show this. How shall I show this? Adapt the preconception properly to the particular things. Plato, for instance, subjects definitions to the preconception of the useful, but you to the preconception of the useless. Is it possible then that both of you are right? How is it possible? Does not one man adapt the preconception of good to the matter of wealth, and another not to wealth, but to the matter of pleasure and to that of health? For, generally, if all of us who use those words know sufficiently each of them, and need no diligence in resolving (making distinct) the notions of the preconceptions, why do we differ, why do we quarrel, why do we blame one another?
Cite this passage
Epictetus, Discourses 2.17 ¶2, tr. George Long (1877)
https://whatwouldstoicsdo.com/passage/discourses/2.17.2
Epictetus, Discourses (as recorded by Arrian), tr. George Long (1877). Text: Standard Ebooks (CC0). Sources and licences
In plain English
AI-written notesEveryone uses words like good, bad and useful and assumes they understand them, yet people attach good to wealth, to pleasure or to health and so quarrel endlessly. The disagreement shows that these basic ideas have not been carefully worked out and applied to real cases.
Older wording
- “preconception”
- — a basic natural idea of something, such as what is good
Themes and situations
- Judgements and impressions
- Virtue and character
- Learning and progress
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