Cicero (on the Stoics) · 106–43 BCE
On Duties 3.119 — Cicero (on the Stoics)
Translation by Walter Miller (1913)
Cicero (on the Stoics), On Duties 3.119
As I have shown that such expediency as is opposed to moral rectitude is no expediency, so I maintain that any and all sensual pleasure is opposed to moral rectitude. And therefore Calliphon and Dinomachus, in my judgment, deserve the greater condemnation; they imagined that they should settle the controversy by coupling pleasure with moral rectitude; as well yoke a man with a beast! But moral rectitude does not accept such a union; she abhors it, spurns it. Why, the supreme good, which ought to be simple, cannot be a compound and mixture of absolutely contradictory qualities. But this theory I have discussed more fully in another connection; for the subject is a large one. Now for the matter before us.
Cite this passage
Cicero (on the Stoics), On Duties 3.119, tr. Walter Miller (1913)
https://whatwouldstoicsdo.com/passage/on-duties/3.119
Cicero, On Duties (De Officiis), tr. Walter Miller (Loeb, 1913). Text: Perseus Digital Library (CC BY-SA 4.0). Sources and licences
In plain English
AI-written notesAnything advantageous that conflicts with doing right is not truly advantageous, and sensual pleasure conflicts with doing right too. Trying to blend pleasure and goodness into one supreme aim fails, because the highest good must be a single, pure thing.
Older wording
- “moral rectitude”
- — doing what is morally right
- “supreme good”
- — the highest aim of life
Themes and situations
- Virtue and character
- Pleasure and pain
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