Cicero (on the Stoics) · 106–43 BCE
Tusculan Disputations 5 ¶62 — Cicero (on the Stoics)
From “Whether Virtue Alone Be Sufficient for a Happy Life”
Translation by C. D. Yonge (1853)
Cicero (on the Stoics), Tusculan Disputations 5 ¶62
You see, I imagine, how Epicurus has divided his kinds of desires, not very acutely perhaps, but yet usefully: saying that they are “partly natural and necessary; partly natural, but not necessary; partly neither. That those which are necessary may be supplied almost for nothing; for that the things which nature requires are easily obtained.” As to the second kind of desires, his opinion is that anyone may easily either enjoy or go without them. And with regard to the third, since they are utterly frivolous, being neither allied to necessity nor nature, he thinks that they should be entirely rooted out. On this topic a great many arguments are adduced by the Epicureans. And those pleasures which they do not despise in a body, they disparage one by one, and seem rather for lessening the number of them. For as to wanton pleasures, on which subject they say a great deal, these, say they, are easy, common, and within anyone’s reach. And they think that if nature requires them, they are not to be estimated by birth, condition, or rank, but by shape, age, and person; and that it is by no means difficult to refrain from them, should health, duty, or reputation require it; but that pleasures of this kind may be desirable, where they are attended with no inconvenience, but can never be of any use. And the assertions which Epicurus makes with respect to the whole of pleasure are such as show his opinion to be that pleasure is always desirable, and to be pursued merely because it is pleasure; and for the same reason pain is to be avoided, because it is pain. So that a wise man will always adopt such a system of counterbalancing as to do himself the justice to avoid pleasure, should pain ensue from it in too great a proportion; and will submit to pain, provided the effects of it are to produce a greater pleasure: so that all pleasurable things, though the corporeal senses are the judges of them, are still to be referred to the mind, on which account the body rejoices while it perceives a present pleasure; but that the mind not only perceives the present as well as the body, but foresees it while it is coming, and even when it is past will not let it quite slip away. So that a wise man enjoys a continual series of pleasures, uniting the expectation of future pleasure to the recollection of what he has already tasted. The like notions are applied by them to high living; and the magnificence and expensiveness of entertainments are deprecated, because nature is satisfied at a small expense.
Cite this passage
Cicero (on the Stoics), Tusculan Disputations 5 ¶62, tr. C. D. Yonge (1853)
https://whatwouldstoicsdo.com/passage/tusculan-disputations/5.62
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, tr. C. D. Yonge (1853). Text: Standard Ebooks (CC0). Sources and licences
In plain English
AI-written notesDesires can be sorted into those that are natural and necessary, natural but unnecessary, and neither, and the last group should be rooted out entirely. The necessary ones are cheap to satisfy, and the optional ones can be enjoyed or skipped easily. The Epicurean wise person weighs pleasure against the pain it will cost, and lavish feasts are dismissed because nature is satisfied cheaply.
Older wording
- “wanton pleasures”
- — sexual or indulgent pleasures
- “counterbalancing”
- — weighing pleasure against the pain it brings
- “deprecated”
- — disapproved of
Themes and situations
- Desire and craving
- Simplicity and frugality
- Pleasure and pain
- Self-discipline and habit
- Money, status and wanting more
- Breaking a bad habit
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